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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Meet David Oakley: a Wisconsin resident and convicted deadbeat dad of nine 
minor children.  Oakley is $25,000 arrears in child support payments.1  Despite his 
physical ability to do so, Oakley cannot seem to keep a fulltime job, and he openly 
admits that he will never be able to support his current or future children.2   
Now meet Kristie Trammell: an Indiana resident convicted of child neglect on 
two separate occasions.  One of theses convictions resulted from Trammell’s neglect 
of her infant son, J.T., who consequently died of severe malnutrition and 
dehydration.3  Trammell ignored many signs of J.T.’s worsening condition and also 
ignored the warnings of several people, including doctors and her own mother, that 
J.T. needed proper care and medical attention.4  
For both of these defendants, the respective Wisconsin and Indiana trial courts 
chose to issue sentences of probation.5  Recognizing that probationers do not enjoy 
the absolute liberty that non-probationers do,6 the sentences included conditions 
restricting the defendants’ rights to procreate.  On appeal, however, one court struck 
down this probation condition as excessive.7 
Each of the courts deliberated over the issue of whether a restriction that 
abrogated a probationer’s right to have a child was reasonably related to the goals of 
the probation.  Putting aside the highly emotionally charged atmosphere, the Indiana 
court of appeals in Trammell held that the condition was not reasonably related to the 
                                                                
1State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 202-03 (Wis. 2001), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 74 (2002). 
2Id. at 217. 
3Trammell v. State, 751 N.E.2d 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). 
4Id. at 285-86. 
5Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 203; Trammell, 751 N.E.2d at 286. 
6Carey v. Population Services Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 688-89 (1977); Arx v. Schwarz, 517 
N.W.2d 540 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).  
7Trammell, 751 N.E.2d at 291. 
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probationary goals.8  In contrast, while utilizing a more deferential standard of 
review, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the condition was reasonably 
related to the goals to withstand constitutional analysis.9   
In the fall of 2004, the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed this same issue in Ohio 
v. Talty.10  The Talty court chose to strike down the antiprocreation restriction within 
a deadbeat dad’s community control sanction, or probation order.11  However, the 
Talty court’s approving language of State v. Oakley, where the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin upheld the antiprocreation restriction as a condition of probation, 
fundamentally set the stage for Ohio to join the Oakley precedent in the future. 
This Note discusses the constitutionality of antiprocreation restrictions as they 
relate to the purposes and goals of probation, in the context of the Talty, Oakley, and 
Trammell decisions.  This Note addresses the ramifications and implications of these 
restrictions in relation to the deadbeat parent crisis, and it proposes more adequate 
means to accomplish the competing goals of child welfare and adherence to 
constitutional doctrine. 
Section II introduces and dissects the fundamental right to procreate as it is found 
under two concepts: the right itself and the right to privacy.  Section III discusses the 
purposes of probation, generally, and articulates two leading ways state courts deal 
with antiprocreation restrictions in probation sentences.  Section IV provides the 
factual and procedural backgrounds of Trammell, Oakley, and Talty.  It further 
provides a full analysis of the Oakley and Talty rationales.  Section V discusses how 
the Oakley and Talty courts respectively misapplied, expressly and impliedly, the 
constitutional review of these probation conditions.  Section VI sets forth the 
ramifications and implications of Talty and Oakley.  Section VII illustrates how the 
Indiana case of Trammell v. State, where the appellate court used a “less restrictive 
means” analysis, properly struck down an antiprocreation condition,12 and calls for a 
nationwide adoption of a less restrictive means test.  This section also makes the call 
for, and proposes, more legislation that directly compensates the children involved in 
these situations. 
II.  THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PROCREATE 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor once explained that “the Constitution is the 
cornerstone of our nation’s commitment to principles of representative government 
and majority rule,” while the Bill of Rights is clearly, and purposefully, an 
antimajoritarian document.13  The Bill of Rights (the “Bill”) built a wall around 
certain fundamental freedoms,14 which, theoretically, limits a majority’s ability to 
intrude upon these freedoms.15  As originally adopted, the Bill’s purpose was to limit 
                                                                
8See generally id.  (discussing, throughout, the goals and purposes of probation). 
9See Oakley, 629 N.W. 2d 200. 
10State v. Talty, 814 N.E.2d 1201 (Ohio 2004). 
11Community control sanctions are the functional equivalent to probation.  Id. at 1205. 
12Trammell, 751 N.E.2d at 289-90. 
13Sandra Day O’Connor, The Majesty of the Law 59 (Craig Joyce ed., 2004).  
14U.S. Const. amend. V. 
15O’CONNOR, supra note 13, at 59. 
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the federal government’s abuse of power and to ensure the sovereignty of the states 
in legislating in furtherance of the Bill of Rights’.16  Years later, Congress adopted 
the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires the states to accord all citizens due 
process and equal protection, similar to the Fifth Amendment’s protections.17     
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments each provide that neither the federal nor 
state governments shall deprive any person, “of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law.”18  This clause, the Due Process Clause, is interpreted as instituting 
two separate limits on these governments, that of “procedural due process,” and that 
of “substantive due process.”19   
Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow 
before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.20  Substantive due process 
poses the question of whether the government has an adequate reason for taking 
away a person’s life, liberty, or property.21  
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporates most of the Bill’s protections, such as freedom of religion, 
freedom of the press, and the right to privacy under the Amendment’s use of the 
word “liberty.”22  Because of this incorporation, states, like the federal government, 
cannot encroach upon these fundamental rights.23  
Some rights, quite decidedly, were not expressly set forth in the Bill.  The 
Framers singled out only a small number of fundamental principles.24  The purpose 
of this was to refrain from diminishing the significance and importance of the Bill 
itself.25  Justice O’Connor explains that, “a laundry list of lesser rights, such as the 
right to wear powdered wigs in public, would sit uneasily beside such fundamental 
liberties as freedom of speech and religion.”26  The Court has historically adhered to 
this belief and its converse that some rights are so implicit in the concept of liberty 
that the Court must hold them to be fundamental, because one would never consider 
the need to enumerate such a basic right.27  The Court, accordingly, offers them 
                                                                
16Id.  
17Id.  
18U.S. CONST. amend. V and XIV. 
19Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies § 7.1 (2d ed. 2002).   
20Id. 
21Id.  
22See O’CONNOR, supra note 13, at 59. 
23Id.  
24Id.  
25Id. at 59-60.  
26Id. 
27Skinner v. Oklahoma, ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (finding the right to 
procreate fundamental).  Accord Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding constitutional 
protection in reproductive autonomy); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding the right 
to marriage fundamental); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding the right to 
purchase contraceptives protected by the fundamental right to privacy). 
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special protections during appellate review, via heightened scrutiny, under 
substantive due process.28  
A.  The Right to Procreate  
The Court originally rejected its current position that the right to procreate is 
fundamental in Buck v. Bell, and it, accordingly, need not be offered heightened 
protection by the courts.29  Here, the Court stated that it was perfectly constitutional 
for the state of Virginia to involuntarily sterilize mentally retarded persons.30  The 
state institutionalized the named plaintiff, Carrie Buck, an 18 year old woman.31  
Justice Holmes, who delivered the opinion of the Court, described Carrie Buck as a 
“feeble minded white woman.”32  The Justice went on to advocate the Court’s 
position by explaining that, “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough.”33   
Arguably, the Court first recognized the right to procreate as a protected 
fundamental right in the 1942 landmark decision of Skinner v. Oklahoma.34  There, 
the Skinner Court declared the Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act 
(OHCSA) unconstitutional.  OHCSA allowed courts to order the sterilization of men 
convicted two or more times for crimes of “moral turpitude.”35  Justice Douglas, 
writing for the Court, stated, with urgency, the sensitive area sterilization statutes 
invade – the basic human right to produce offspring.36   He explained, “[Procreation] 
involves one of the basic civil rights of man. . . . Procreation [is] fundamental to the 
very existence and survival of the race.”37  Justice Douglas’ strong language 
emphasizes the fundamental nature of procreation, because of which the Court has 
treated the right as fundamental in most, if not all, of its subsequent decisions.38 
                                                                
28See generally supra note 27.  Appellate courts review impingements on fundamental 
rights by utilizing strict scrutiny.  The United States Supreme Court, however, affords abortion 
the slightly, less strict standard of review, “unduly burdensome,” even though abortion is still 
regarded as a right held within the fundamental right to procreate.  See generally Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
29Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).   
30Id. 
31Id. 
32Buck, 274 U.S. at 205.  In 1980, however, Carrie Buck was evaluated as a woman of 
normal intelligence and was living with her sister, who had also been sterilized by the state.  
See Stephen Jay Gould, Carrie Buck’s Daughter, 2 CONST. COMMENT. 331, 336 (1985). 
33Buck, 274 U.S. at 207. 
34316 U.S. 535 (1942).  The United States Supreme Court overturned a sterilization statute 
that applied to burglars but did not apply to embezzlers.  The State convicted each class of 
felons on the identical actus reus and mens reus elements.  The Court found that the statute’s 
classification violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, while 
finding the right to procreate fundamental. 
35Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536-37. 
36Id. at 536. 
37Id. at 541. 
38E.g., Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding the right to an 
abortion fundamental on the grounds that the right to procreate and not to procreate are 
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B.  The Right to Privacy 
The fundamentality of the right to procreate gains further support by the Court’s 
decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut39 and Eisenstadt v. Baird,40 which discuss 
privacy rights.  Although the United States Constitution does not explicitly mention 
any right to privacy,41 the Court recognizes that a right of personal privacy, or a 
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, exists under the Constitution.42  In 
varying contexts, the Court has found the roots of the right in the First Amendment,43 
in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,44 and in the concept of liberty guaranteed by 
the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.45   
Specifically, the Griswold Court recognized the existence of penumbras, or, 
“surrounding areas or periphery of uncertain extent,”46 which contain implied rights 
within the guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights.47  Various guarantees found 
within the Bill of Rights create zones of privacy.48  Without these elements, which 
act as subparts to these guaranteed rights, substantive due process rights, and those 
expressed in the Bill, have no foundation to stand upon.49  The Court, further, cited 
the Ninth Amendment, which provides: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of 
                                                           
fundamental); Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding the right to contraception fundamental 
because the right to procreation is fundamental).  In Skinner, the Supreme Court holds the 
right to procreate fundamental.  However, the Court in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), held 
sterilization of mentally retarded people constitutional.  The distinction lies in that Justice 
Douglas distinguishes between similarly situated inmates in Skinner, versus all mentally 
retarded people in Buck.  
39381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding the ban of contraceptives to married persons as an 
unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of married persons). 
40405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding a statute that prohibited the sale of contraceptives to 
unmarried persons unconstitutional on equal protection grounds). 
41See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); see also Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 at 482 
(noting that the First Amendment does not mention the right to educate a child in a school of 
the parents’ choice, however it has been construed to include that right). 
42See Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977); Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. 
43Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). 
44See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 
(1967); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Boyd 
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
45See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); see also Roth v. Bd. of Regents, 408 
U.S. 564, 572 (1972). 
46BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 522 (2d pocket ed.) (2001).  
47Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85 (holding the First, Third, Fourth and Fifth Amendments 
are buttressed by penumbras like privacy).  This approach, the “penumbra approach,” has been 
treated as and is now analogous to a due process analysis.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at § 
10.3.2. 
48Griswold, 381 U.S. at 514.    
49See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at § 10.3.2. 
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certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people.”50   
Griswold helped clarify that only personal rights can be deemed “fundamental,” 
or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”51  The decision also affirms that the 
right to privacy has some extension to activities relating to marriage,52 procreation,53 
contraception,54 family relationships,55 child rearing, and education.56 
In Eisenstadt, the Court reaffirmed that personal privacy is a fundamental right 
protected by the Constitution, and that the right to procreate falls under its 
umbrella.57  The Eisenstadt Court held that, if the right to privacy means anything, it 
means freedom from governmental intrusion into matters “so fundamentally 
affecting a person as the decision to bear or beget a child.”58 
More recently, the Court explicated that the lower courts’ roles are not to 
mandate any sort of “moral code” for the nation.59  Instead, the courts’ duties should 
extend only to protect a person’s liberty.60  The Court recognizes that an aspect of 
“liberty” protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
this right to personal privacy in certain areas or zones.61  The right of personal 
privacy includes “the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important 
decisions.”62  The Court has not determined how far-reaching this right is or where 
this right to personal privacy ends.  That being said, it is certain that an individual 
may make personal decisions, without unjustified government interference, “relating 
                                                                
50Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IX) (emphasis added). 
51Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 
(1937)).  It should be noted Justice Douglas avoided a substantive due process argument as the 
basis of the Griswold decision.  Professor Erwin Chemerinsky notes that this action was taken 
in response to the Lochner era of the Court, which generally did not afford this somewhat 
broader analysis.  Today, the penumbral approach is treated as a substantive due process 
analysis.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at § 10.3.2. 
52Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding the right to marry fundamental). 
53Skinner v. Oklahoma, ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541-542 (1942) (holding the 
right to procreate fundamental).  
54Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (holding the right to contraception 
fundamental).  
55Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
56Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer, 262 U.S. 390. 
57See generally Eisenstadt, 405 U.S 438. 
58Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (citations ommited). 
59Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003); Casey, 505 U.S. at 850 (stating the United 
States Supreme Court’s “obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate [its] own 
moral code”).  
60See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, 571.   
61Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977). 
62Id. 
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to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and 
education.”63 
III.  PROBATION PARTICULARS 
When government regulation significantly impinges on a fundamental right or 
upon personal liberty, the state prevails only upon a showing of a subordinate, 
compelling government interest.64  The Court established, however, that probationers 
do not enjoy the same degree of freedom and liberty as those citizens who have not 
broken the law.65  The commonly requisite strict scrutiny review in such cases, 
therefore, is inapplicable.66  The Court, notably, has yet to establish a test or rule in 
any matter as to what extent the government may infringe upon a probationer’s 
fundamental rights.67  
A.  Probation: Purposes and Rationale 
In lieu of jail time, a court may extend a probation agreement to the defendant.  
Here, the probationer agrees to abide by a catalog of restrictions, called probation 
conditions, in consideration for avoiding a prison term.68  
Generally, the purpose of probation is two-fold: (1) to protect the public welfare 
while the probationer is at large and (2) to facilitate rehabilitation for the offender.69  
Trial courts utilize broad discretion when instituting probation conditions.70  At the 
very least, these conditions, when restricting certain constitutional rights, must 
reasonably relate to the probationary purposes and to the criminal activity itself.71  
                                                                
63State v. Trammell, 751 N.E.2d 283, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Carey, 431 U.S. 
678 at 685). 
64See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960). 
65See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).  Here, the United States Supreme Court 
upheld a statute denying a felon, who served his complete sentence, the fundamental right to 
vote.  The Court recognized felons do not enjoy the same degree of liberty as non-felons.  
66See Elizabeth F. McCright, Prohibiting Deadbeat Dads from Fathering More Children . . 
. What’s Next? The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s Decision in State v. Oakley, 86 MARQ. L. 
REV. 153, 172 (2002).  But see Devon A. Corneal, Note, Limiting the Right to Procreate: State 
v. Oakley and the Need for Strict Scrutiny, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 447, 468 (2003). 
67See State v. Talty, 814 N.E.2d 1201 (Ohio 2004); Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 202-03; see 
also Trammell, 751 N.E.2d 283; People v. Pointer, 151 Cal. 3d 1128 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).  
Each court applies a different appellate review where probation conditions impinge the 
fundamental right to procreate. 
68LAURA DIETZ, 21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law §907 (2004).  It should be noted that 
courts disfavor challenges to probation agreements based upon contractual theory.  However, 
for the purposes of explaining probation’s purposes and rationales only, a contractual 
metaphor defines the parties’ intents in a simple manner. 
69Id.  See Trammell, 751 N.E.2d 283; see Pointer, 151 Cal. 3d 1128 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
70See 21A DIETZ, supra note 68.  Wisconsin statutory law supports the proposition that 
courts have broad discretion when instituting probation conditions.  See Edwards v. State, 246 
N.W.2d 109, 110-11 (Wis. 1978); State v. Garner, 194 N.W.2d 649, 651-52 (Wis. 1972).  
71Id. at 111-12.  See Gordy v. State, N.E.2d 190 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). 
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On review, conditions that the court finds to be vindictive, vague, overly broad, or 
unreasonable will be stricken from the probation order.72   
B.  Constitutional Challenges to Probation Conditions, Tests Used by Courts 
The general population usually perceives probation as a gift – the gift of not 
serving a prison sentence.  Under this rationale, known simply as the “Act of Grace 
Doctrine,”73 a court treats probation as a privilege that the probationer should accept 
thankfully, despite whatever constitutionally-held rights the conditions in the 
probation order may infringe.74  In 1973, the United States Supreme Court explicitly 
rejected this doctrine, explaining that “a probationer can no longer be denied due 
process in reliance . . . that probation is an ‘act of grace.’”75   
Since the demise of the Act of Grace Doctrine, courts in Wisconsin, Ohio and 
numerous other states have held that probation conditions may impinge on 
probationers’ fundamental rights, so long as the conditions are reasonably related to 
the probationer’s rehabilitation and the public’s protection.76  This reasonableness 
standard is the most deferential test used by an appellate court when reviewing a trial 
court’s probation order.  It requires only that the conditions must not be vague, 
excessive or illegal.77  
Notably, when a probation condition does impinge on a fundamental right, some 
forward-thinking courts employ a more stringent review, or special scrutiny 
standard.78  For example, the Indiana court of appeals in Trammell v. State79 utilized 
this special scrutiny.  The review entails balancing (1) the purpose sought to be 
served by probation, (2) the extent to which constitutional rights enjoyed by law 
abiding citizens should be afforded to probationers, and (3) the legitimate needs of 
law enforcement.80  Even if these factors weigh in favor of the state, the state must 
still demonstrate that no less intrusive means exist to accomplish these goals.81 
                                                                
72See 21A DIETZ, supra note 68; see also Garrett v. State, 680 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1997); Kahn v. State, 700 So. 2d 767 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1997). 
73Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1934). 
74Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). 
75Id. at 782. 
76See, e.g., United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 150 (5th Cir. 1979) (“[The] probation 
condition is not necessarily invalid simply because it affects probationer’s ability to exercise 
constitutionally protected rights”); State v. Talty, 814 N.E.2d 1201 (Ohio 2004); Smith v. 
State 727 N.E.2d 763, 767 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“The condition may impinge upon a 
probationer’s exercise of an otherwise constitutionally protected right”); Edwards v. State, 246 
N.W.2d 109, 111 (Wis. 1976) (“Conditions of probation may impinge upon constitutional 
rights as long as they are not overly broad and are reasonably related to the person’s 
rehabilitation”). 
77Corneal, supra note 66, at 465; see also 21A DIETZ, supra note 68. 
78See United States v. Consuelo-Gonazalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975); Pointer, 
151 Cal. 3d 1128; Trammell, 751 N.E.2d 283.   
79Trammell, 751 N.E.2d at 289. 
80Id. at 289.  California courts use a slightly more stringent, narrowly tailored test.  In 
addressing the “reasonably related” prong, the court will invalidate a condition if it:  
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IV.  TRAMMELL, OAKLEY, AND TALTY:  THE NATION’S THREE LEADING CASES 
CONCERNING ANTIPROCREATION RESTRICTIONS 
A.  Trammel v. Indiana 
On April 25, 1999, Kristie Trammell gave birth to a son, J.T.82  From the outset, 
Trammell failed to take her son to multiple doctors appointments, including his two-
week check-up and his initial immunization appointment.83  
Approximately six weeks before J.T.’s death, Trammell left the child in the care 
of her mother, Carol Hatcher.84  While in Hatcher’s care, J.T. experienced vomiting 
and suffered severe diarrhea.  Hatcher testified at trial that Trammell’s older 
daughter, S.P., experienced the same conditions as an infant and subsequently 
underwent corrective esophageal surgery.85  Hatcher alerted Trammell to J.T.’s poor 
condition, and Trammell told her mother she would make an appointment for her son 
with his doctor, but never did.86  A few days later, according to Hatcher, J.T.’s eyes 
“looked funny” and were “deep set into his head.”87 
Just after midnight on September 20, 1999, Trammell returned home from 
shopping.  She fed J.T., who regurgitated most of his milk.88  Trammell put J.T. to 
sleep.  She looked into his room the next morning and saw J.T. lying in his 
bassinet.89  Trammell left the house without feeding him and returned home around 
3:30 p.m.  She then left again to run various errands.  She returned home and took 
care of some matters concerning her daughter, and moved some outdoor plants 
before checking on her son.90 
J.T. had died at approximately 5:00 a.m. that morning from “emaciation, 
dehydration and salt or electrolyte imbalance due to chronic malnutrition,” according 
to forensic pathologist Dr. John Heidingsfelder, who also performed the autopsy.91 
                                                           
“(1) has no relationship to the crime which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to 
conduct which is not itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not 
reasonably related to future criminality.  Furthermore, where a condition impinges on 
a fundamental right, the court must determine whether the condition is impermissibly 
overly broad.” Pointer, 151 Cal. 3d at 1139; see also People v. Dominguez, 256 
Cal.App.2d 623, 627 (1967). 
81Trammell, 751 N.E.2d at 287.  
82Id. at 285. 
83Id. 
84Id. 
85Id. 
86Id. 
87Trammell, 751 N.E.2d at 286. 
88Id. 
89Id. 
90Id. 
91Id. 
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The state of Indiana charged Trammell with child neglect of a dependent as a 
Class B Felony.92  The trial court found Trammell guilty, but mentally ill due to 
mental retardation, sentencing Trammel to eighteen years in prison.  The trial court 
determined Trammell would serve eight years of the prison sentence on probation.93  
As a condition of the probation, the trial court ordered Trammell not to become 
pregnant.94 
Upon appeal of the antiprocreation condition, the Indiana court of appeals 
vacated the probation order.95  Indiana appellate courts utilize a heightened scrutiny, 
comparable to a less intrusive means standard, discussed in Section III(B), supra.  
The Indiana court of appeals held that the existence of numerous less intrusive 
means, which did not severely affect the right to procreate, rendered the probation 
order invalid.96 
B.  Wisconsin v. Oakley  
Arrears $25,000 in child support, David Oakley, the defendant in Wisconsin v. 
Oakley, could not support his nine children.97  The state of Wisconsin charged him 
with four counts of refusing to pay child support as a repeat offender, a felony in the 
state of Wisconsin.98  Oakley pleaded “no contest” to the charges.99  The trial court 
imposed both a three year prison sentence and five years probation following his 
incarceration.100  The court ordered that, “[W]hile on probation, Oakley cannot have 
any more children unless he demonstrates that he has the ability to support them and 
that he is supporting the children he already has.”101  If Oakley did procreate, the 
                                                                
92Trammell, 751 N.E.2d at 286 
93Id. 
94Id. 
95Trammell, 751 N.E.2d at 289. 
96Id.  
97State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 202 (Wis. 2001), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 74 (2002).  
The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that, despite Oakley’s non-payment, his actions were 
unintentional when considering relevant factors such as his unemployment, his drug addiction 
problems and his status as a welfare recipient.  The Court accepted Oakley’s statement that, if 
he had the money, he would pay his outstanding debt to his children.   
98Id. at 204-05.   The statutory sanction against non-payment of child support is defined as 
a Class E felony for any person, “who intentionally fails for 120 or more consecutive days to 
provide spousal, grandchild or child support which the person knows or reasonably should 
know the person is legally obligated to provide . . . .”  WIS. STAT. ANN. § 948.22(2) (West 
2000).  A Class E felony is punishable with “a fine not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment not 
to exceed 2 years, or both.”  Id. at § 939.50(3)(e).  The legislature has amended this statute so 
that intentionally refusing to pay child support is now punishable by up to five years in prison.  
See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.50(3)(e) (West Supp. 2001). 
99Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 206. 
100Id. at 203.  The probation condition allowed Oakley to avoid a prison sentence totaling 
eight years. 
101Id. 
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state would incarcerate him.102  Upon appeal, both the Wisconsin court of appeals 
and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the probation condition.103  The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, utilizing the less stringent reasonableness test, held that 
the condition was not overly broad and was reasonably related to the probationary 
goals.104 
The majority in Oakley impliedly determined the procreation condition to be 
reasonable based on the outdated Act of Grace doctrine (discussed supra, Section 
III(B)).  The Wisconsin court stated, “because Oakley was convicted of [a felony], 
[he] could have been imprisoned for six years . . . this probation condition, which 
infringes on his right to procreate during his term of probation, is not invalid under 
these facts.”105  The Oakley court argued that Oakley, in contractual terms, got the 
benefit of the bargain.  The majority’s statement can hardly be distinguished from 
the rationale that probation is a privilege that should be “thankfully accepted by the 
probationer, despite whatever constitutionally held rights were infringed,”106 because 
the act of granting probation is clearly a gift from this court.  
The Oakley court further explained that antiprocreation restrictions survive 
constitutional analysis because convicted individuals do not enjoy the same degree of 
liberty as non-criminal citizens.107  Since criminals do not share the same “clean 
slate” as non-criminals, probation conditions forced upon a probationer may impinge 
upon his constitutional rights, so long as the conditions are not overly broad and are 
reasonably related to the probationer’s rehabilitation.108 
                                                                
102Id. 
103Id. 
104Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 206.  Oakley argued that the condition infringed on his 
fundamental right to procreate, therefore, the condition must be subject to a strict scrutiny 
analysis.  “That is, it must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”  Oakley, 
629 N.W. 2d at 207-08.  On a national scale, the Oakley court adopted the standpoint of the 
minority of jurisdictions.  See United States v. Smith, 972 F.2d 960, 962 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(procreation restriction imposed on defendant convicted of heroin possession invalid); Pointer, 
199 Cal. Rptr. at 365 (procreation restriction imposed on defendant convicted of child 
endangerment overly broad where less restrictive means existed to provide safety for 
children); People v. Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 269 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (condition that 
defendant convicted for heroin possession not become pregnant during probation invalid); 
Howland v. State, 420 So. 2d 918, 919-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (condition prohibiting 
defendant from fathering a child not reasonably related to crime of child abuse where other 
less restrictive means existed to protect future children); People v. Ferrell, 659 N.E.2d 992, 
995 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (“no-pregnancy” condition for defendant convicted of battery of a 
two-month-old child struck); State v. Trammell, 751 N.E.2d 283, 290-91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) 
(condition prohibiting defendant convicted of child neglect from becoming pregnant while on 
probation violated the right of privacy).  
105Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 201-02. 
106Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1935). 
107State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 207 (Wis. 2001); see also Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 
U.S. 868, 874 (1987). 
108Oakley, 629 N.W. at 210. 
2004-05] HOW OHIO V. TALTY PROVIDED FOR FUTURE BANS 153 
The Oakley court concluded that the antiprocreation restriction did not 
permanently eliminate the defendant’s ability to exercise his constitutional right, and 
therefore, the condition was not overly broad.109  In contrast to Carrie Buck in Buck 
v. Bell, once the term of the probation expired, Oakley retained the ability and 
freedom to father more children.  More importantly, Oakley could satisfy the 
condition of probation by making efforts to support his children as required by 
law.110  The Oakley court also held that the condition was reasonably related to the 
goal of rehabilitation because it prevented the defendant from creating more victims, 
should he continue to intentionally refuse to support his children.111 
C.  Ohio v. Talty 
1.  Historical and Procedural Backgrounds 
On February 27, 2002, the state of Ohio indicted Sean E. Talty, an Akron 
resident, on two counts of non-support of dependants in violation of O.R.C. §§ 
2929.21 and/or 2929.21(B),112 “a fourth degree felony, for unlawfully and recklessly 
failing to provide adequate support for three of his seven children.”113  Talty initially 
plead not guilty to the non-support charges, but later changed his plea to no 
contest.114  The Medina County Court of Common Pleas accepted his plea, and found 
him guilty of all of the counts charged in the indictment.115   
Prior to sentencing, the presiding judge, Judge James L. Kimbler,116 ordered each 
party to the action to submit briefs to determine “whether or not the Court can 
lawfully order that, as a condition of [Talty’s] supervision by the Adult Probation 
Department, [Talty] may not impregnate a woman while under supervision.”117  Each 
party filed a brief in support of their position.118   
After reviewing the arguments, the court held that it did in fact have the power to 
institute such a restriction.119  Further, the court held that such a community control 
                                                                
109Id. at 212; see also State v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697 (Ore. Ct. App. 1998).  
110Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 203. 
111Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 212. 
112Ohio v. Talty, No. 02CA0087-M, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 2907 (Ohio Ct. App., Medina 
County June 18, 2003). 
113Id. at *2. 
114Id. 
115Id. 
116Robert. E. Pierre, In Ohio, Supreme Court Considers Right to Procreate, WASH. POST, 
May 11, 2004, at A02. 
117Talty, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 2907, at *2. 
118Id. at *2.  The America Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Ohio, upon motion to 
intervene, also submitted a brief as amicus curiae.  The ACLU argued that the trial court did 
not have the authority to impose such a restriction as a term of probation on the fundamental 
right to procreate.  Id. at *2-3. 
119Id. 
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sanction, a form of probation,120 was consistent with the purposes of probation, as 
dictated by O.R.C. § 2929.11(A),121 and sentenced Talty to community control for 
five years under the general supervision of the Adult Probation Department.122   
Judge Kimbler ordered Talty:  
1) to make regular payments of $75 a week for each case he maintained 
with to the Medina County Child Support Enforcement Agency; 2) to 
make all reasonable efforts to remain employed on a fulltime basis; 3) to 
obtain a GED within five years; 4) to make all reasonable efforts to avoid 
conceiving another child while under the supervision of the Medina 
County Adult Probation Department.123   
In Ohio, community control sentences operate as the functional equivalent to 
probation sentences.124  As long as it is not required by the court to do otherwise, the 
trial court may impose a sentence on a felonious offender that consists of one or 
more of these community control sanctions.125  Such sanctions, like probation 
conditions, include stipulations such as the offender must abide by the law, and must 
not leave the state without the permission of the court or the offender’s probation 
officer.126  The court can also impose any other condition under a community control 
sanction that the court considers “appropriate.”127   
Like the majority of states, Ohio’s laws dictate that the trial court retains broad 
discretion in determining the conditions of a probation order.128  However, the trial 
court may not impose any arbitrary conditions, which in purpose or in effect, burden 
                                                                
120Id. at *3.  Community control is the functional equivalent to probation.  Id. at *9.  A 
“community control sanction” is defined by Ohio Revised Code § 2929.01(F) (West 2003) as 
a sanction that is not a prison term and is described in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.15(West 
2003) (community control), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.16 (West 2003) (residential 
sanction), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.17 (West 2003) (nonresidential sanctions) or OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.18 (West 2003) (financial sanctions; restitution).  Talty, 2003 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 2907, at *3, n.2. 
121OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.11(A) (West 2003). This statute defines the purposes of 
felony sentencing as, “the overriding purposes of felony sentencing are to protect the public 
from future crime by the offender and others and to punish the offender. To achieve those 
purposes, the sentencing court shall consider the need for incapacitating the offender, deterring 
the offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution 
to the victim of the offense, the public, or both.” 
122Talty, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 2907, at *3. 
123Id. 
124Id. at *9. 
125Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.15(A)(1)); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2929.16; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.17; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.18. 
126Talty, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 2907, at *9-10. 
127Id. at *10.  See State v. Sturgeon, 742 N.E.2d 730, 733 (Ohio 2000). 
128OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2951.02; Lakewood v. Hartman, 714 N.E. 2d 902, 904 (Ohio 
1999); State v. Jones, 550 N.E.2d 469, 470 (Ohio 1990). 
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the defendant in the exercise of his or her liberty.129  Ohio case law defines 
“arbitrary” as “bearing only a remote relationship to the crime for which [defendant] 
was convicted and to the objectives sought by probation of education and 
rehabilitation.”130  Similarly to Wisconsin’s doctrine, when the trial court invokes a 
probation sentence, it, therefore, may not be so overly broad as to unnecessarily 
infringe on the constitutional rights of the probationer.131  Talty appealed the 
antiprocreation restriction; however, the Ohio court of appeals upheld the 
condition.132 
Upon review, Ohio appellate courts currently utilize a “reasonableness” standard, 
or the Jones test, to determine whether a trial court’s probation order and its 
conditions should be upheld.133  The Supreme Court of Ohio, in State v. Jones,134 set 
fourth a three-part test to determine whether a probation condition is sufficiently 
related to the interests of doing justice, rehabilitating the offender, and ensuring the 
offender’s good behavior.135   
Under Jones, courts should consider each of the following: (1) whether the 
condition is reasonably related to the rehabilitating the offender, (2) whether the 
condition has some relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, 
and (3) whether the condition relates to the conduct which is criminal or reasonably 
related to future criminality and serves the statutory ends of the probation.136  
Notably, although community control sanctions are not exactly the same as 
probation,137 the trial court’s authority – as it is with probation – is not limitless and 
those conditions may not be overly broad as to impinge upon the offender’s 
liberty.138 
Utilizing the Jones test,139 the Ohio court of appeals found that the reasonableness 
standard governs the validity of the community control sanction.140  Even though the 
issue involves a fundamental right, the court of appeals held that, because Talty was 
a felon, he was not entitled to the heightened scrutiny.141 
                                                                
129Talty, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 2907, at *7-8 (citing State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 
1335, 1336 (Ohio Ct. App., 1976)). 
130Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335, 1337 (Ohio Ct. App., 1976). 
131State v. Maynard, 547 N.E.2d 409, 411 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988).  
132See generally Talty, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 2907. 
133Livingston, 372 N.E.2d at 1337. 
134State v. Jones, 550 N.E.2d 469, 470 (Ohio 1990). 
135Id. 
136Talty, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 290, at *8-9. 
137Talty, 814 N.E.2d 1201 (Ohio 2004).  See State v. Lake, 781 N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (Ohio 
Ct. App., 2002) (citing State v. Jahnke, 772 N.E.2d 156 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002)). 
138State v. Jahnke, 772 N.E.2d 156, 158 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002). 
139Jones, 550 N.E.2d at 470. 
140Talty, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 290, at *27. 
141See generally Talty, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 290.  See supra Section III (discussing the 
limited rights of probationerss). 
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The Ohio Supreme Court agreed that the Jones test governed this type of review, 
but the court struck down the appellate court’s holding.142  The court found that the 
condition was overly broad under Jones, and accordingly it vacated that portion of 
the trial court’s community control sanctions.143  
2.  Application of Jones  
The Ohio Supreme Court in Talty chose not to address the constitutionality of the 
antiprocreation restriction in the probation order, saying only that the court will not 
reach constitutional issues unless absolutely necessary.144  Instead, the court focused 
only on the non-constitutional argument: whether the sanctions met the Jones test.145   
In its opinion, the Talty court dispensed of the out-of-date “act of grace” doctrine, 
which the Wisconsin Supreme Court relied upon heavily.  The court did agree that 
probationers do not enjoy the same liberties and freedom as those not convicted of 
breaking the law.146  However, the Ohio Supreme Court reiterated that the fact that 
the state might have incarcerated Talty does not, in itself, justify an intrusion upon 
his or her rights.147 
The Talty court’s rejection of the “Act of Grace Doctrine” rests on the undisputed 
proposition that infringements on constitutional rights must be tailored to meet 
specific government interests.148  These interests differ depending on whether the 
defendant is incarcerated or subject to community control sanctions.149 
The Talty court used the example of a person incarcerated for a crime wholly 
unrelated to procreation — burglary — who is denied conjugal visits.150  This is 
arguably an infringement on this person’s right to procreate; however, the regulation 
keeping a person who otherwise would not be at the prisonis reasonably related to 
the legitimate state interest of maintaining the security of the prison.151  On the other 
hand, for the same crime of burglary, a probationer may not be denied the right to 
procreate based on that same government interest (prison security), because the 
reality is that probationers are free from restraint like non-probationers.  A legitimate 
government interest, in this situation, does not exist. 
                                                                
142Talty, 814 N.E.2d at 1202. 
143Id. 
144Id. at 1203.  See In re Miller, 585 N.E.2d 396, 405 (Ohio 1992); Hall China Co. v. Pub. 
Util. Comm., 364 N.E.2d 852, 854 (Ohio 1977). 
145Id. 
146Id. 
147Talty, 814 N.E.2d at 1206 (citing United States v. Tolla, 781 F.2d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 1986); 
United States v. Pastore, 537 F.2d 675, 681 (2d Cir. 1970); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 
782 (1973). 
148Talty, 814 N.E.2d at 1206. 
149Id. 
150Id. 
151Id.; see also Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 137 (2nd Cir. 1994); Goodwin v. 
Turner, 908 F.2d 1395, 1398 (8th Cir. 1990). 
2004-05] HOW OHIO V. TALTY PROVIDED FOR FUTURE BANS 157 
Summarily, it follows for the Ohio Supreme Court that a legitimate penological 
interest may be different from a legitimate probationary interest.152  The government 
would make an unwise and erroneous conclusion that it may withhold any right from 
a probationer simply because the court could have imprisoned the probationer.153 
Second, the court analyzed the antiprocreation restriction under its Jones 
reasonability standard.  If a probation condition or community control sanction can 
not meet the three-part Jones test, the condition unnecessarily infringes on the 
probationer’s liberty, and the condition is deemed overly broad.154  The overly broad 
threshold, therefore, determines the reasonableness of the condition.155 
The availability of readily apparent alternatives to the regulation demonstrates 
this “unreasonableness.”156  However, in Talty, the court noted that this 
unreasonableness standard is not the functional equivalent of a “least restrictive 
alternative” test.157  Courts need not summon and exhaust every conceivable, 
alternative method to accommodate an offender’s constitutional complaint.158   
Rather, the test is this: if the probationer himself devises a scheme in which the court 
can meet the purpose of the probation order without infringing on the probationer’s 
fundamental rights, the trial court arbitrarily infringed on those rights.159  
Thus, the Talty court found that Jones stands for the proposition that probation 
conditions must be reasonably related to the statutory ends of probation and must not 
be overly broad.160  Since community control sanctions act as the functional 
equivalent to probation, the Jones test applies in this case with equal force.161 
Under the Jones analysis, Talty asserted that the Ohio Supreme Court should 
strike down the procreation restriction in the community control sanction because it 
did not provide an opportunity for the condition to be lifted if he fulfilled his child 
                                                                
152Talty, 814 N.E.2d at 1206. 
153Id. 
154Talty, 814 N.E.2d. at1204.  See State v. Jones, 550 N.E.2d 469, 470 (Ohio 1990).  Other 
jurisdictions have recognized the same proposition.  See, e.g., Hughes v. State, 667 So. 910, 
912 (Fla. Ct. App., 1996) (asserting that the trial court may not impose conditions of probation 
that are “overbroad and can be violated unintentionally”); Williams v. State, 661 So.2d 59, 61 
(Fla. Ct. App., 1995) (stating that the trial court may not “impose conditions of probation 
which are overbroad”); State v. Friberg, 435 N.W.2d 509, 515 (Minn. 1989) (noting that 
probation not only must be reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing, but must not be 
“unduly restrictive of the probationer's liberty or autonomy”). 
155Talty, 814 N.E.2d at 1204.  See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1987). 
156Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. 
157Talty, 814 N.E.2d at 1204 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91). 
158See Talty, 814 N.E.2d at 1204-05 (emphasis added); see also Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91.   
159The Ohio Supreme Court states, “[b]ut if an [offender] can point to an alternative that 
fully accommodates the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests, a 
court may consider that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable 
relationship standard.” Talty, 814 N.E.2d at 1204-1205 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 91). 
160Talty, 814 N.E.2d at 1205. 
161Id. 
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support obligations.  Talty argued, therefore, that the condition was overbroad.162  
The State of Ohio, conversely, cited Wisconsin v. Oakley163 as authority supporting 
its argument that the condition placed on Talty was reasonable. 
The Ohio Supreme Court turned the State’s argument around, using Oakley for 
the purpose of proving the condition was overly broad because it lacked a 
mechanism to release the condition, or a time constraint.164  The court stated that, 
based on the altered scenario that the time constraint had been part of Talty’s 
sanctions, the court would not at this time determine the condition’s validity.  The 
court impliedly embraces, however, the anti-procreation concept by stating, “such a 
mechanism would have been, at the very least, an easy alternative [better] 
accommodating Talty’s procreation rights at de minimis costs to the legislative 
interests.”165  The court implied, therefore, that such a mechanism would likely make 
the restriction valid.  To the court, this accommodation tallies up to a lower cost to 
the legitimate probationary interests of rehabilitation and avoidance of future 
criminality.166 
V.  ANALYSIS: TOGETHER, OAKLEY AND TALTY SET THE WRONG PRECEDENT 
A.  Oakley’s Approval of Overly Broad Conditions 
The Oakley court made a few fatal errors in determining that the antiprocreation 
imposed on Oakley – that he could not sire any more children until he demonstrates 
he can provide for his current and future children – was reasonably related to the 
statutory goals of rehabilitation of the defendant.  
In Oakley, the state of Wisconsin chose to grant Oakley probation, and with that 
he retained a significant amount of privacy as compared to imprisoned felons.  While 
the state chose not to exercise control over Oakley’s body by depriving him his 
freedom from restraint — or imprisonment, it does not follow that the state may 
automatically opt to exercise unlimited control over his right to procreate and his 
right to privacy.167 
The Oakley court made a crucial error in the application of the reasonableness 
test.  The Oakley court held, under this analysis, that impinging a probationer’s 
fundamental right is lawful so long as the impinging condition is not overly broad.168   
However, the court ignored issues like the condition’s enforcement and the 
condition’s effects on future partners of Oakley (discussed infra, Section VI).  The 
court held the probation condition valid because the order allocates time restrictions 
                                                                
162Id. 
163Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 202-03. 
164Talty, 814 N.E.2d at 1205. 
165Id. 
166Id. 
167Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 216 (Bradley, J., dissenting).  All three female justices of the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court dissented in the Oakley opinion. 
168Id. at 210 (quoting Edwards, 246 N.W.2d 109). 
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to the condition.169  While time limits are indicative of a narrowly tailored test, the 
Oakley court should not have held this single element determinative.170  Instead, the 
court should have addressed all of the readily apparent implications of the 
procreation restriction.171   
The condition is overly broad in other ways.  The Oakley court fails to 
acknowledge its own findings: Oakley did not have the means, nor would he ever 
likely have the means, to support his children.172  Effectually, if the court’s findings 
are true, the court extinguished his right to procreate.  Further, the Oakley court 
failed to state what amount of money would be sufficient to fulfill the condition, only 
reciting that Oakley fulfills the condition when he “has demonstrated”173 he can 
support his current and future children.174  The court should not validate such a vague 
standard.175  
The Oakley majority further asserts that the procreation restriction is reasonably 
related to Oakley’s rehabilitation because it prevents Oakley from creating more 
victims should he continue not paying child support.176  Since the birth of his next 
child triggers the probation condition, Oakley’s “rehabilitation” commences only 
when he fathers more children, or breaks the law.177  Nothing in the court’s reasoning 
illustrates how the probation condition will actually rehabilitates Oakley if he does 
not sire another child.  The condition does not, for example, teach Oakley how to 
sustain employment or master a way to support the other victims, his current 
children.    
B.  Talty’s Misapplication of Jones 
Employing the Oakley court’s reasoning, the Talty court strikes down the 
community control sanction against Talty based on the fact that the condition 
                                                                
169Id. at 212.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court pointed out that the probation condition 
ceases once Oakley demonstrates he can support his current and future children; or, the 
condition ceases when the five year probation period expires.  Id. 
170Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).  The United States Supreme Court found 
time limits for affirmative action cases to be a necessary element of a narrowly tailored 
education program.  The Court also found other elements, such as a complete look at a 
student’s diversity character, rather than a cursory look at skin color, necessary for a valid 
program.  Consideration of just one of these factors does not transform the program into a 
narrowly tailored one.  While the Court has not applied the measures necessary for a valid 
education affirmative action program to other law that requires an appellate court to use strict 
scrutiny on review, like procreation infringements, it provides an analogous baseline; see also 
Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Powell, J., writing for the 
plurality of the Court).  
171Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 216. 
172Id. at 217. 
173Id. at 203. 
174Id. 
175See 21A DIETZ, supra note 68. 
176Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 213. 
177Id. at 217 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
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contained no escape hatch, the time constraint.178  The Talty court only takes time to 
ponder, “What if Mr. Talty could pay his obligations?  How would the restriction 
end?” 
The Talty court expressly notes the trial court’s decision, to place the 
antiprocreation restriction on Talty, stemmed from the trial court’s desire to help 
Talty avoid future violations of the same law.179  The Ohio Supreme Court goes as 
far as to say that this goal is valid, though overly broad because the condition lacks 
an “out.”180  Although this court states it does not consider whether the escape 
mechanism renders the condition valid under Jones, the court’s emphasis on Oakley 
certainly leans in the direction that it would.181  
Furthermore, the Talty court impliedly enunciates that a time-restrictive condition 
is valid under Jones by failing to address the remaining Jones factors.182  The court 
lost an opportunity to address the real matters at the heart of the case: the 
constitutionality of the condition, the rehabilitative character of probation, and 
whether a “less intrusive means” test is better suited for situations when a 
fundamental right is at stake.183 
Under Jones, the first issue a court addresses is whether the sanction or 
restriction is reasonably related to rehabilitating the offender.184  Clearly, the ban on 
procreation is not.  While the production of future victims is arguably halted 
(discussed infra Section VI), nothing in the restriction aids Talty.  The condition 
does not help Talty find steady employment or teach him parenting skills.  It does 
not make him a more productive citizen and a supportive father.  The restriction only 
accomplishes cutting off a person’s fundamental right to procreate and right to 
personal privacy as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.185 
Second in the Jones analysis, the condition must have some relationship to the 
crime committed by the probationer.186  This is perhaps the only prong of Jones that 
is fulfilled, though an exceedingly attenuated relationship exists, at best.  Talty’s 
children do not receive monetary support from him, which is a crime in Ohio.187  The 
condition in the sanction states that Talty cannot sire any more children.188  The only 
nexus that exists is that the crime and the condition involve children and Talty.  
However, no nexus exists between Talty siring more children and Talty providing 
proper support for his current children.  The court cannot say with any certainty that 
                                                                
178State v. Talty, 814 N.E.2d 1201, 1205 (Ohio 2004). 
179Id. 
180Id. 
181Id. 
182Id. at 1206-07. 
183Talty, 814 N.E.2d at 1210 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). 
184Talty, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 2907, at *8-9 (citing Jones, 550 N.E.2d at 470-71).   
185Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977). 
186Talty, 814 N.E.2d at 1207. 
187Talty, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 2907, at *1-2. 
188Id. 
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Talty would provide the same support to each of his children; or that personal 
factors, like marriage to another woman or a stronger father-child bond, would not 
affect his disposition of support to his future children versus his current children.   
Lastly, under Jones, the condition must relate to the charged conduct that is 
criminal or reasonably related to future criminality, serving the statutory ends of the 
probation.189  The statutory ends of probation are doing justice, rehabilitating the 
offender, and insuring the offender’s good behavior.190  Placing a ban on a person’s 
right to procreate in no way serves justice, as none of the actual problems, like 
education of the probationer and payment to the probationer’s current children, are 
met.  At most, this restriction offends justice and the long precedent set by the United 
States Supreme Court.191 
Moreover, the Talty court points to constitutional doctrine that defines 
reasonableness as a “burden that fully accommodates the probationer’s rights at a de 
minimis cost to valid penological interests.”192  The court specifically notes that if the 
probationer himself can point to a less intrusive mean to achieve the statutory ends of 
the probation, the court may take that as evidence of an overly broad condition.193  
Under this rationale, no procreation ban survives review, because almost any 
probationer can list less intrusive means that do not offend his liberty interests while 
serving the penological interests, doing justice, rehabilitating the offender, and 
insuring the offender’s good behavior.194  Education, counseling, and work release 
programs facilitate rehabilitation at a lower cost to the probationer’s liberty interest 
than those endorsed by the Wisconsin and Ohio Supreme Courts.  Talty’s 
antiprocreation condition bears only a remote relationship to the crime for which the 
State convicted him and to the objectives sought by probation and rehabilitation.  
Jones explicitly forbids this remote relationship.195   
VI.  RAMIFICATIONS OF PROCREATION RESTRICTIONS AS PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Apart from the constitutional impingements these antiprocreation restrictions 
support, for many persons who disagree with the Oakley-Talty rationales, the 
question whether the condition is really that bad remains.  If your answer is, “no,” 
the reason for this acquiescence likely hinges on the notion that the antiprocreation 
condition ends the production of more victims.  Unfortunately, this is not true.   
A. Forced Sacrifice of One Liberty Interest for Another 
The government must provide due process, both procedural and substantive, 
when there has been a deprivation of liberty.196  Until recently, the United States 
                                                                
189Id. at *8-9 (citing Jones, 550 N.E.2d at 470-71). 
190Id. 
191See supra notes 26 and 27. 
192Talty, 814 N.E.2d at, 1204 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-1). 
193Id. 
194Jones, 550 N.E.2d at 470-71. 
195Livingston, 372 N.E.2d at 1337. 
196CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at § 7.3.   
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Supreme Court narrowly defined “liberty.”197  Today, the Court has avoided 
explicitly defining “liberty” as found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; 
however, it has attempted clarifying its meaning.198  In Roth v. Board of Regents, the 
Court stated:   
The term denotes not only freedom from bodily restraint but also the right 
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations 
of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring 
up children, . . . and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . 
. as essential to the orderly pursuit . . . .  In a Constitution for a free 
people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of “liberty” must be broad 
indeed.199   
Roth and the precedents set by Griswold and Eisenstadt clearly indicate that the 
definition of “liberty” includes not only those rights that are expressly stated in 
textual context, but also those that are not, such as the right to procreate. 
As noted in Sections IV and V, the Oakley and Talty courts posited a choice to 
their respective probationers: sacrifice their rights to procreate for their freedom of 
restraint, or retain their rights to procreate and sacrifice their freedom from restraint.  
Such a choice is an example of the “unconstitutional conditions doctrine.”200 This 
doctrine, well established in law and in scholarship pertaining to constitutional law, 
prohibits the government from conditioning a privilege on the requirement that a 
person give up a constitutional right.201    
If one accepts the faulty Oakley perception that probation, or freedom from 
restraint in this context, is a privilege granted by the state,202 it must therefore follow 
that a person should not be forced to sacrifice his right to procreate for probation.  To 
do so would impermissibly condition a privilege, probation, on the relinquishment of 
a constitutional right, procreation.203  Because the Supreme Court has yet to address 
the extent to which a state may impinge on a probationer’s fundamental rights,204 the 
constitutionality of this sacrifice also remains questionable.   
Notably, in most cases involving restrictions of a probationer’s rights, the actual 
sacrifice of that right is not, in contractual terms, the “consideration” for the 
                                                                
197See McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517 (1992) (holding that a liberty interest 
exists only if a right existed.  A privilege, granted by the government, at one time was not a 
basis for requiring due process) (emphasis is added).  Contra Roth, 408 U.S. at 472.    
198Roth, 408 U.S. at 572. 
199Id. 
200Timothy C. Layton, Welfare for Lobbyists or Nonprofit Gag Rule: Can Congress Limit 
a Federal Grant Recipient’s Use of Private Funds for Political Advocacy?, 47 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 1065, 1069 (1997) (citing Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 1413, 1414-1416, (1989)).   
201Layton, supra note 200, at 1069. 
202Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1935). 
203Layton, supra note 200, at 1069. 
204Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 688-89 (1977); Arx v. Schwarz, 517 
N.W.2d 540 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994). 
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“bargain.”  For example, in some states, probationers, as a condition of their 
probation, indefinitely lose their rights to vote.205  The Court has upheld that 
condition’s constitutionality.206  The distinction between the voting cases and 
Oakley-Talty may be subtle, but devastating in its effects.  Simplistically, these 
courts are telling the probationer, “You may go free so long as a child is not born.  If 
you cannot agree to this, or if a child is born, you will return to prison.”  In the 
voting cases, the courts are telling the probationer, “You can go free but you may not 
vote.”  The latter restriction does not invade an autonomic right, personal to human 
beings; nor has the probationer been asked to sacrifice one right for another.  Further, 
procreation involves one of the basic civil rights of man, fundamental to the very 
existence of the race.  Voting, while an indelible and vitally imperative right of 
citizens of the United States, is not.  
B.  The Practical Impact of an Impractical Punishment 
1.  Enforcement of the Decision against Male and Female Probationers 
Had the Talty condition contained a time restraint (hereinafter “revised 
condition”), the state of Ohio could not enforce or regulate the revised condition.  
The probation condition sends Talty to prison the moment he sires another child.  
Two problems arise from this decision: general enforcement and an issue of fairness.   
First, no state has the means to prevent a probationer from engaging in sexual 
intercourse; nor can a state ensure that a probationer will take all of the necessary 
steps to prevent conception, and that those steps are 100 percent effective.  In 
striking down a similar antiprocreation condition of a man convicted on federal drug 
charges, the Federal Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit properly explained that, 
“short of having a probation officer follow [Defendant] twenty-four hours a day, 
there is no way to prevent [him] from having more children.”207 
Second, if a male probationer sires another child during the probation term, the 
state, possibly, will not know of the violation.  If a woman probationer is subject to 
such a condition, her violation inevitably becomes apparent to that state because, at 
some point, her pregnancy will be visible.208  Thus, an unfair advantage in the sphere 
of enforcement exists in favor. 
Under the female probationer scenario, if a court convicts a woman of non-
payment of child support and subjects her to the same probation condition as the 
Talty revised condition, the state provides her with two choices: (1) have an abortion 
to avoid jail time; or (2) have the child and go to prison.  Few can conceptualize a 
larger burden than having one’s choice to parent a child rest on that person’s 
                                                                
205Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).  
206Id. 
207Vivian Berger, Bedroom Sentence, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 17, 2001, at A1.  Also, the United 
State Supreme Court has held that the bedroom is a setting where government legislation has 
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Excessive Intrusion on Procreative Rights, 36 IND. L. REV. 857, 878 (2003). 
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willingness to face a prison sentence.209  While it has been duly noted that 
probationers do not enjoy the same liberty as non-criminals,210 it is utterly doubtful 
that the United States Supreme Court wishes to endorse the result of this state action: 
coercive abortion.211  The Supreme Court holds abortion to be unique and “[the] most 
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime.”212  Clearly, state 
action does not belong in this realm of privacy. 
2.  The Effects on Male Probationers’ Female Partners is Unduly Burdensome 
Matters that concern the intimate choices of people lie at the core of personal 
dignity and at the center of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.213  
The Supreme Court holds that women’s liberty interests are unique to both the 
human condition and the law,214 and that states must be extremely careful not to 
cause additional personal suffering when attempting to regulate abortion.215  The 
right to privacy supports the notion of women’s liberty because it “involves personal 
decisions concerning not only the meaning of procreation but also human 
responsibility and respect for it.”216 
Like a penny, the right to procreate is two-sided.  A woman retains the choice to 
procreate and a choice not to procreate.  The Court holds that the government enjoys 
no legitimate interest in a fetus until it reaches the point of viability.217  Prior to that 
point, the state cannot impose legislation that unduly burdens her decision.218  The 
Oakley decision and the Talty revised condition ignore the Court’s precedent. 
                                                                
209See id.  While this Note’s scope excludes a full analysis as to whether a male or female 
probationer suffers more, it is recognized, both legally and logically, that making this choice, 
as a female probationer, involves different factors due to mere biology; see also Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).  The Casey Court stated, “the liberty of the 
woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human condition . . . .  The destiny of the woman 
must be shaped in a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives”; see also 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding the restriction on abortion impinges the woman’s 
right to privacy and her choices in regards to her personal autonomy). 
210Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).  The United States Supreme Court upheld a 
statute denying a felon who served his complete sentence the fundamental right to vote.  The 
Court recognized felons do not enjoy the same degree of liberty as non-felons.  
211Citing the language of People v. Pointer, 151 Cal. 3d 1128 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), the 
Chief Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Justice Bradley, describes these 
antiprocreation restrictions’ effects upon partners of male probationers tantamount to 
“coercive abortion.” 
212Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. 
213Id. at 850. 
214Id. at 852. 
215Id. at 852. 
216Amanda R. Schehr, Note, State v. Oakley: Infringing on Women’s Reproductive Right, 
18 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 281, at 284 (2003) (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 852). 
217Casey, 505 U.S. at 873.  The Casey Court defines viability as the point when the fetus 
can live outside the mother’s womb. 
218Id. at 876-77. 
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Courts upholding antiprocreation restrictions in probation orders of deadbeat 
dads largely disregard the effects such a condition places on a probationer’s 
partner.219  A probationer’s partner’s procreation rights, logically, are directly linked 
to the probationer.220  Notwithstanding the fact that the partner’s constitutional rights 
are predicated on a man’s felonious behavior, the “no further children” requirement 
creates a hostile environment.221 
A state regulation may be found to be an undue burden on a woman’s decision not 
to procreate, and therefore her right to procreate, if it places a substantial obstacle in the 
path of a woman who seeks an abortion.222  Although parental consent laws and 
informed consent laws do not constitute an undue burden,223 other regulations that 
entail an increase in risk of death or serious injury to the woman are found to create a 
“substantial obstacle.”224  However, the state action must amount to more than just an 
inconvenience.225  
Because the trigger of the Oakley condition and Talty revised condition is the 
birth of another child, the risk of imprisonment creates strong motivation for a man 
in Talty’s or Oakley’s positions to demand a woman to terminate her pregnancy, or 
worse, fall victim to deadly, domestic violence.226  This regulation clearly entails an 
increased risk of death or serious injury; accordingly, it unduly burdens the partner’s 
right to choose to have the child.227  By advocating these probation conditions, the 
Oakley and Talty courts clearly contradict the Supreme Court’s handling of the right 
to procreate since the inception of Roe v. Wade and its progeny.228 
3.  Child Support Possibilities Eliminated for the Current Children 
If the State of Ohio sends Talty to prison for fathering another child, his other 
children ultimately suffer.  These antiprocreation restrictions, by themselves, do 
                                                                
219See generally State v. Talty, 814 N.E.2d 1201, 1206 (Ohio 2004); Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 
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little, if anything, to further the support interests of any child.  Combined with the 
fact that the entire community control sanction in Talty ordered Talty to make 
regular payments of $75 a week to the Medina County Child Support Enforcement 
Agency,229 the revised condition becomes redundant and unnecessary.230     
The states’ imprisonment of these probationers prevents the probationers from 
meaningful involvement in their children’s lives, which may victimize the children 
far more than any of the probationers’ actions.231  The trial courts in Talty and Oakley 
sought to avoid the further victimization of the children.232  By imposing a redundant 
and non-rehabilitative condition, however, the trial courts set the probationer up for 
failure.233  By not examining the ramifications of the condition, the courts have 
created a tool that operates in the exact opposite manner than intended — not only is 
the chance of monetary support stripped from the children, but the opportunity for 
emotional support is as well. 
C.  The Societal Implications of Antiprocreation Restrictions  
1.  Criminality for Impoverished Parents   
The birth of a child is now a crime in the United States.  In the opening 
statements of the dissenting opinion in Oakley,234 Justice Bradley makes vehemently 
clear that “the majority’s decision allows, for the first time in our state’s history, the 
birth of a child to carry criminal sanctions.”235  The Talty court stepped into the same 
line as the Oakley precedent by grandly stating that the restriction needed only a time 
release mechanism.236  
The Oakley court justified its position that the antiprocreation conditions were 
valid by stating that the conditions stop the production of more victims.237  This is 
not true.  Even if the probationer uses contraception, birth control methods are not 
                                                                
229Talty, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 2907, at *5-6. 
230In Rodriguez v. State, the Fla. District Court of Appeals held a similar condition 
redundant due to other probation conditions, and was not reasonably related to the defendant’s 
rehabilitation since it did nothing to ensure the prevention of future criminality.  378 So. 2d at 
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100 percent reliable.238  If the probationer used reasonable care and the protection 
failed, ultimately resulting in the birth of a child, that child will carry the stigma of 
knowing its birth sent its father or mother to prison.239 
Furthermore, the financial status of a probationer may dictate the likelihood of 
future parenthood, as wealth now becomes a prerequisite to parenthood.  As a 
growing trend, courts are increasingly punitive towards fathers who do not pay child 
support.240  The courts’ views of this “irresponsibility” take three forms: (1) they 
bring into the world illegitimate children they do not intend to support; (2) they leave 
marriages they should remain in; and (3) they fail to pay child support.241  The courts 
use this perceived “irresponsibility” to justify increasingly punitive measures against 
non-custodial parents.242   
One way the state can affect the “immorality” of such non-custodial parents is to 
restrict their fundamental rights to procreate.243  Applying this rationale, states may 
use this as justification to restrict the fundamental rights of the poor.  For example, 
Talty’s attorney stated to the press that if Talty were a man of means, he would have 
paid the support; his attorney explained that Talty did not have any money and that 
he was supporting his children to the best of his ability.244  The trial court, appellate 
court, and the Ohio Supreme Court did not dispute this conclusion.245  In fact, Wade 
F. Horn, assistant secretary for children and families at the United States Department 
of Health and Human Services, recognizes that not everyone who owes money is a 
deadbeat dad, and that “some people just don’t have the money.”  However, in the 
narrow, overprivileged views of these courts, low-income families become less 
deserving of parenthood, justifying further unconstitutional restrictions on their 
fundamental rights.246 
The revised condition in Talty offers a brightline rule that few courts could 
misapply.  And, like many simplistic solutions, the ramifications and effects of the 
solution devalue the ease of its application.  By granting the state the power to decide 
                                                                
238See Planned Parenthood, Facts About Birth Control at http://www.plannedparentood. 
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who has the right to have children, it bases its decision on an individual’s financial 
status.247  If a court can eliminate a person’s right to have a child solely on the 
grounds of non-payment of child support, what is to say the court could not eliminate 
someone’s right to have a child on account of poverty?  The Oakley-Talty precedents 
do so by lumping together fathers who simply cannot pay with fathers who refuse to 
pay.  The distinction may be subtle, and in some cases nearly difficult to distinguish, 
but it is absolutely crucial to identify. 
The courts of the United States, moreover, have never rationed the right to have a 
child on the basis of wealth.248  Americans are free to have as many children as 
desire.249  They may do so without the means to support their children, and then face 
the legal consequences resulting from their inability to provide for them.250  This 
fundamentally precious right is “at the very heart of [a] cluster of constitutionally 
protected choices.”251  Bending the right in this manner only adds confusion and 
injustice to the lives of those living in poverty.   
2.  Buck v. Bell Rears its Ugly Head 
The newest, most taxing infringement on procreation rights is “pay-up or submit 
to surgery.”  Some legal scholars tout the latest affront on the right to procreate as an 
aftershock of the Oakley decision.252  In Kentucky, Campbell County Judge Michael 
“Mickey” Foellger gave at least seven men the choice of serving a civil contempt 
order for refusing to pay child support or having a vasectomy.253  Judge Foellger 
believes his orders lie within legal bounds because he does not specifically order any 
of the men to have the procedure.254  Instead, Judge Foellger offers a vasectomy as an 
“option” in certain civil contempt cases.255  For example, if a man has four or more 
children, by three or more women, and he is at least $10,000 arrears in child support 
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payments, the man might be allowed to undergo a vasectomy rather than spend up to 
six months in jail.256  
Judge Foellger’s court has kept each of the cases confidential.257  But, according 
to the Judge, six men have accepted this offer since he became Campbell County’s 
first and only family court judge in January of 2003.258  Only one father opted for a 
prison term.259  
Judge Foellger contends: “Most of the men have shown some relief when they 
are offered something they should have thought of themselves. . . .  These are the 
type of people who live on spontaneity.  They just float through life irresponsibly.”260  
Judge Foellger sets standards for these men based on his own morality.  It is not the 
purpose or role of the courts, however, to do so.261  Instead, the Supreme Court 
maintains that it is the courts’ duty to protect a person’s liberty.262 
Furthermore, Judge Foellger clearly abdicates the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine.  Here the court asks the defendant to sacrifice his personal autonomy for his 
freedom from restraint.  There is no difference between this and “sacrifice your right 
to procreate for your freedom from restraint,” as explained in Section VI(A). 
Judge Foellger, in contrast, argues that the imposition of this choice educates the 
public that having a child is a responsibility, and therefore the choice itself is 
appropriate.263  However, communicating to parents that they should take their duties 
more seriously does not justify manipulating a person’s procreation right as a 
personal service announcement.  Judge Foellger has failed to explain how this 
invasive vasectomy, which may or may not be reversible,264 teaches the virtues of 
responsibility.  Instead, his message simply scares men into choosing their freedom 
from restraint over their rights to procreate and to personal autonomy.  Judge 
Foellger backs his position only by proclaiming, “I felt like [they] were 
indiscriminately procreating.”265  Clearly, the Judge is mandating his own moral 
code.     
Despite the constitutional issues looming over the Foellger cases, Judge 
Foellger’s offer may be illegal on other grounds “because nothing in the Kentucky 
Child Support Guidelines authorizes a judge to use this technique as a remedial 
                                                                
256Id. 
257Id. 
258See Hannah, supra note 253, at 1A. 
259Id. 
260Id. 
261See generally Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
262Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. 
263See Hannah, supra note 253, at 1A. 
264http://www.vasectomy.com/main.asp (follow “Reversal Home” hyperlink; then follow 
“Top 10 Reversal Microsurgery Questions and Answers” hyperlink).  The author last visited 
this site January 20, 2006. 
265See Hannah, supra note 253, at 1A. 
170 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 19:141 
measure.”266  While state law often authorizes a circuit judge in a court of general 
jurisdiction to employ “equitable remedies,”267 the mere definition of “equitable 
remedy” pulls the ground out from underneath this argument.   
An equitable remedy, simply stated, signifies that “no other adequate remedy at 
law”268 exists.  Here, plenty of alternative, adequate remedies exist.  Better 
legislation, harsher probation guidelines, state-supervised employment – all 
constitute adequate remedies that better serve the defined probationary purposes, 
without offending the fundamental right to procreate.  Despite these obvious 
alternatives, Judge Foellger makes no plans to discontinue his sterilization scheme.269   
In his opinion for the Skinner Court, which effectually overturned Buck v. Bell, 
Justice Douglas states, “[t]he power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-
reaching and devastating effects.  In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types 
which are inimical to the dominant group to whither and disappear.  There is no 
redemption for the individual whom the law touches . . . .  He is forever deprived of 
his basic liberty.”270  In the spirit of the Supreme Courts of Ohio and Wisconsin, 
Judge Foellger fervently ignores the cautionary foresight of the United States 
Supreme Court.  
VII.  BETTER SOLUTIONS THAN A BAN ON PROCREATION 
A.  Precautionary Measures, A Less Intrusive Means Standard for the Courts 
There is no doubt that the child support dilemma in the United States is 
measurably grave, causing children to be raised in poverty.271  As the Supreme Court 
of Wisconsin points out, the deadbeat parent epidemic fosters a crisis with 
devastating implications for our children.272  Of those single-parent households with 
established child support awards or orders, approximately one-third do not receive 
any payments, while another one-third receive only partial payment.273  The 
nonpayment of child support frequently presses single mothers below the poverty 
line.274   
Writing for the majority of the Court in Roe v. Wade, Justice Blackmun stated, 
“[o]ur task, of course, is to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement, free of 
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emotion and of predilection.”275  States always have an important, if not compelling 
interest, to see that children are sufficiently supported.276  However, when a 
fundamental right is at issue, an appellate court should utilize a more searching 
review of the probation conditions.  Constitutional analysis of the right to procreate 
must take center stage over the emotionality of the matter.  The stakes are too high in 
these cases.277   
While the Ohio Supreme Court seemingly settled that, had the Talty community 
control sanction contained a durational limit278 the sanction may be a valid one, other 
proactive states balance their probationary goals and statutory ends against a 
different, more searching backdrop, a “less intrusive means” standard.279  As a case 
of first impression to the Indiana courts, Trammell v. State280 serves as an illustrative 
analysis of more searching standards of review of probation conditions when 
fundamental rights are impinged. 
As in Ohio and Wisconsin, Indiana trial courts retain broad discretion when 
imposing probation conditions.281  In Indiana, the goal of these conditions is to 
produce a law-abiding citizen and to protect the public.282  In some instances, 
probation conditions may impinge upon the probationer’s exercise of an otherwise 
constitutionally protected right.283  These impingements must be constructed to 
achieve the explicit goals of protecting the community and promoting the 
probationer’s rehabilitation process.284  Expressed in other terms, the condition must 
“have a reasonable relationship to the treatment of the accused and the protection of 
the public.”285  
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When a probationer argues that a condition is unduly intrusive on a 
constitutionally-held right, the Indiana appellate courts balance the following: (1) the 
purpose sought to be served by probation; (2) the extent to which constitutional 
rights enjoyed by law abiding citizens should be afforded to probationers; and (3) the 
legitimate needs of law enforcement.286  Even if these factors weigh in favor of the 
state of Indiana, the state must meet one last element: that there are no less intrusive 
means available to accomplish these goals.287 
The Trammell court cites many examples of what constitutes “less intrusive 
means.”288  In the case of Kristie Trammell, mother of J.T., such means include the 
requirement that Trammell submit to pregnancy testing.  If she were to become 
pregnant, Trammell would be forced into prenatal and neonatal programs under the 
supervision of her probation officer and attending physician.289  If the state 
determines that Trammell is unfit to be a parent, protective services could remove 
the child and place it in foster care.290 
Because the Trammell court identified such obvious examples of less intrusive 
means to achieve the goals of probation, while determining that the antiprocreation 
restriction did not meet its rehabilitative end, the Trammell court vacated the 
antiprocreation restriction.291   
Applying the Trammell court’s test to Oakley, the Oakley court would reach a 
more equitable result.292  For example, Wisconsin statutory law allows court-
determined support obligations to be enforced through wage-assignments.293  
Considering Oakley’s ability to work and inability to sustain employment,294 an 
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alternative, the less intrusive means approach, easily translates.  The Wisconsin trial 
court could sentence Oakley to an appropriate prison term, stay the sentence, and 
place him on probation.295  A condition of that probation would be that Oakley serve 
a substantial amount of time in jail, with work release privileges.296   
This kind of probation condition nearly serves all of the interests at stake.  The 
money earned from the work release program would benefit Oakley’s current 
children.  Further probation conditions would also include those that are actually 
rehabilitative to Oakley, like parental counseling and other dependency counseling 
should the Wisconsin trial court deemed them necessary.  And finally, via the 
restriction on his freedom from restraint, the Oakley majority receives what it has 
demanded.  By serving the needs of prison security while incarcerated, Oakley 
would be prevented from procreating as conjugal visits could be denied.   
B.  Remedial Measure, Proactive Legislation 
1.  Current Legislation 
The Framers did not intend that the courts legislate from the bench.297  While it 
was hoped that the courts would function as a blockade against unauthorized 
assumptions of power by the other branches of the government, it was believed that 
the state legislatures would be “sure guardians of the people’s liberties.”298   
The appropriate branch of the government to remedy the deadbeat parent crisis, 
accordingly, is not the judiciary, but the legislature.  Over the past ten years, in 
response to the national attention this crisis has garnered, legislatures have 
introduced and initiated laws criminalizing the non-payment of support.   
Congress made non-payment of child support a federal criminal offense, under 
certain circumstances, through the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992 (CSRA).299  
The CSRA imposed criminal sanctions on those non-custodial parents who willfully 
failed to pay past-due obligations owed to a child residing in another state.300  
CSRA’s intent was to prevent non-custodial parents from fleeing across state lines in 
order to avoid their payment obligations.301  A first-time conviction under the CSRA 
is punishable by up to six months in prison and a fine,302 while a repeat offender may 
be punished up to two years in prison.303   
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Subsequently, Congress passed the Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act of 1998 
(DPPA).  Under the DPPA, non-payment of support obligations is prosecutable at 
the federal level.304  The DPPA amended the CSRA of 1992, establishing violations 
for interstate travel or foreign commerce when evading child support.305   To convict 
a deadbeat parent under CSRA, the government must establish that (1) past-due child 
support is in arrears $5,000 or more, (2) the children are under the age of majority, 
(3) all civil remedies were exhausted, (4) no payments from the deadbeat parent were 
received within the past twelve (12) consecutive months (a payment is considered 
any amount), (5) there is evidence that the non-custodial parent had the ability to pay 
and willfully failed to do so, and (6) there is proof that the non-custodial parent had 
knowledge of the child support obligation.306 
Many state laws now allow officials to suspend driver’s licenses, deny parents 
passports who owe more than $5000, and require paternity matches at birth.307  
According to Wade F. Horn, the assistant secretary for children and families at the 
United States Department of Health and Human Services, the National Directory of 
New Hires is the most effective national legislation to help remedy the child support 
problem yet.308  The registry requires employers to submit lists of all new hires, 
including their wages and unemployment claims, on a quarterly basis.309  Those 
employees who have outstanding child support claims raised against them 
automatically have their wages garnished.310  This legislation significantly increased 
collections.  From 2001 to 2002, collections grew by six percent.311 
Proactive legislation like the National Directory of New Hires and the Deadbeat 
Parents Punishment Act of 1998 work directly to achieve the states’ goal: 
enforcement of child support obligations.  Such legislation is necessary, as it avoids 
offending the fundamental right to procreate. 
2.  Proposed Legislation 
While Congress instituted compensatory legislation, more needs to be done.  At 
least two of the five prima facie elements of a CRSA action should be strengthened.  
Currently, only children under the age of majority can benefit from this criminal 
action.312  If Congress extended the requisite age such that children could sue 
deadbeat parents when the children reach the age of majority, deadbeat parents 
would have less of an opportunity to avoid their responsibilities.  If Congress 
extended eligibility for suit to twenty-one years old, these children would be given 
three years at a legally competent age to determine, on their own accord, whether the 
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action should be brought.  This revised requirement acts in both a punitive manner 
(punishing the deadbeat parent for his or her lack of support during the child’s 
minority), but it is rehabilitative for the child.  The child, in his or her majority, is 
finally given the control to bring their parent to justice. 
Also, Congress should dispense of the requirement to exhaust all civil remedies 
before bringing a CRSA action.  The requirement should rest on the number of past-
violations a deadbeat parent has accrued.  If a deadbeat parent violates his or her 
support obligations a determinable amount of times, the child, after each new 
violation, should immediately be allowed to bring suit, instead of needing to exhaust 
all civil remedies for each new violation.  A child who is forced to wait that much 
longer is not only a drain on society’s resources, but is suffering from lost-
opportunities, which only a sufficiently-funded childhood can provide. 
All of these legislative measures are truly compensatory and punish those parents 
who do not fulfill their obligations.  The legislative branches of the state and federal 
governments possess a greater ability to assess and institute programs that actually 
compensate the children involved.  While the protection of fundamental rights is 
often left to the courts, decisions like Talty and Oakley leave room for the courts to 
abdicate this responsibility. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
It is well settled that probationers do not enjoy the same degree of freedom as 
non-criminals.313  When dealing with a basic civil right of man,314 however, the 
courts should submit to a test that safeguards the probationer and society from its 
overstretched arm.  If such a right is at stake, no court should have the means to 
extinguish that right permanently, or conditionally, if less intrusive means are 
available to achieve the same goal.   
Antiprocreation sanctions as probation conditions cannot feasibly solve the 
deadbeat parent problem because: they are not rehabilitative, they do not improve a 
deadbeat parent’s financial or employment status, and they do not educate.  When 
courts uphold these restrictions, the problems created by the restrictions outweigh 
their minimal beneficial value.  Moreover, courts upholding these conditions seem 
to, at all costs, avoid addressing how these restrictions affect women’s rights.  
Women probationers subject to the same sentence suffer an unfair disadvantage as 
compared to their male counterparts.  If a woman probationer chooses to carry the 
fetus to term, the state will inevitably discover her pregnancy.  Men will not suffer 
this same result. 
Non-criminal female partners of male probationers, sentenced under these 
probation conditions, now face a burdensome decision upon becoming pregnant: 
carry the child to term and send the child’s father to jail, or terminate the pregnancy 
under this duress.  The United States Supreme Court dictates that the government 
may not unduly burden a woman’s right to an abortion.315  If this coin is flipped, the 
government should not unduly burden a woman’s right to have a child.  The 
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conditions restricting a male probationer’s right to procreate, naturally, and 
inseparably, burden his non-criminal partner’s right to conceive a child. 
While judges likely feel that they stand at an impasse – that any remedy they 
institute for non-payment of child support produces no desirable results – this 
hardship does not constitute a valid argument to use the right to procreate as a 
bartering chip.  The protection of reproductive rights in the probation context 
demands, at the very least, a less intrusive means test.  If courts are forced to adopt 
the test, different solutions become readily apparent, such as work release programs 
for the offending parent. 
Furthermore, proactive legislation on behalf of the state and federal legislatures 
presents more effective options than those the courts have the ability to institute or 
develop.  Legislatures have the ability to institute truly compensatory means, like 
wage garnishing and new hire registries that work directly to compensate the 
children of deadbeat parents.316  Legislatures need to recognize the inability of the 
courts to do this, and activate widespread, positive change.   
The United State Supreme Court describes the right to procreate as one that the 
Constitution “jealously guards.”317  While the Oakley court focused solely on its 
desire to stop the production of more victims, abdicating its responsibility to guard a 
constitutional right, the Talty court leaves little room for comfort in its approving 
language of the Oakley decision.  If appellate courts reviewed probation conditions 
that impinge on procreation rights with the Trammell special scrutiny standard, the 
courts, in the absence of legislative action, could design appropriate and effective 
solutions to the difficulties of designing a proper probation sentence. 
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